Are legislatures always weaker than executives Essay

Are legislative assemblys always weaker than executives - Essay ExampleFundamentally, the legislative arm of the presidential term has had two inherent contradictory roles sustaining the executive and holding them to account between electoral cycles. Even though the legislative role of sustaining the executive is not in doubt, parliamentary oversight seems to be a poorly coordinated task that often lets the executive off the hook. Noteworthy, the nexus between sustaining the government and the task of challenging it and holding it to task opens a Pandora box full of fallacious fantasies a fallacious inequity that, no doubt, tilts the balance of mogul towards the executive. Despite the wide acceptation of democratic principles of governance across nations, an understanding that has significantly strengthened accountability and transparency mechanisms with regard to promotion of evidence-informed policy processes, legislatures remain comparatively weaker in congeneric to the execu tive in terms of raw power necessary to effect immediate leadership challenges. The Executive and Parliament A Historical Perspective The repair of constitutional structures with regards to their political behavior and performance is central in the study of comparative governments. In particular, understanding the balance power between the executive and the legislature in either the parliamentary or presidential systems has been an area of focus in political research (Mustapic, 2002). Structured governmental control stems such(prenominal) from the historical politics of the mid- and late nineteenth century. Designed at a time when the role of government was limited in scope, the shape of superiority of the executive power over the legislature indeed antedates the modern presidential and parliamentary systems of governments. From inception to the present day politics, there is no pretense that executive autonomy bears much capacity and capability to remedy or compensate for socia l ills on its own without parliaments approval. In his submission on the subject, Bagehot, a British economist and journalist, referred to the convention of executive authority as the buckle and the lynch-pin in the Whitehall-Westminster model (Flinders, 2002). Though modest in both size and ambition at the time, it was reasonable for a competent minister to have a personal control over small departmental portfolios in the mid-Victorian state. Strikingly similar, governmental administration in the primary quarter of the nineteenth century fell under ministerial responsibility. But even then as is it to date, the powers vested in a ministerial mandate were passing doubtful in terms of usage. Supporting the foregoing, Cobbett (1823) wrote Ankle-pinching socks are like ministerial powers a thing to talk about but for no use a thing to laugh over and a mere mockery at those whom real power is vested. pieces the world over are molded around the imagination of responsible executive au thority for strong and stable leadership. Nothing services this claim better than a two-branch debate that culminated in the creation of the United States Constitution a model constitutional debate that has since served as a roadmap to numerous constitutions around the world. While the federalists such as Alexander Hamilton rooted for